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SUMMARY
During the last twenty years, high and extremely volatile inflation rates in lIatin
America  generally  have  been  associated  with  unstable  monetarv  policies  and  the
(temporary) use of inflationary revenues to finance fiscal deficits.  At the same time,
there appears to  be a widespread agreement that  high inflation is bad for  economic
development and growth.  Thus,  it remains unclear  why governments  have adopted
unstable monetary  policies  in light of  the fact that their  long-run unsastainability  is
known from the beginning.
In this  paper,  we argue  that governments follow  unstable monetary  policies
principally  in  order  to  maximize  their  inflationary  revenues.  We  do  so  because
explanations based on irrationality or on institutional and political shocks as suggested
by a  recent trend of the literature are not entirely convincing.  Temporary  unstable
monetary policies are optimal bewause people tend to revise their expectations (slow-
er)faster in periods of (des)accelerating inflation as the cost of collecting information
is (increased)reduced compared to other welfare losses.  When the rate of inflation is
relatively  high,  a  restrictive  monetary  policy  is  implemented  so  that  people  can
reconstitute monetary  balances, and  when the  rate of  inflation is low, an  expansive
monetary policy is developed to confiscate existing real balances.
How long can governments  benefitfrom unstable  mornetary  policies? They mav
appear successful for some time in  fooling people --by adopting temporary reforms and
restoring confidence-- but the repetition of this mechanism reduces the reputation of the
government.  Ultimately,  the reaction of private  agents to the prospect of  inflation
becomes  so  rapid and  sophisticated that  even  small  fiscal  gaps--or  other  shockls--
produce precipitous declines  in money demand.  Over  time,  private agents  leam  to
anticipate  the  relationship  between  unstable  inflation  and  monetary  policy  anI
progressively reduce their real monetary balance.  In the end, the optimal inflation rate
tends toward its steady-state value as found by Friedman 20 years ago.
A small dynamic model is first developed to stylize the facts described abo\e
and then applied to Argerntina.1. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, Latin  Americani  countries have  endured highi  inflation  --
on average  243 percent per year--, but contrary to the conventional  wisdom  they also
went through  periods of relatively  low inflation. As a result, the voiatility of inflation
has been  extremely  high  in countries  such  as Argen nn, Bolivia,  Brazil  and Peru (Table
1).  High and variable inflation  in Latin  America  nerally has been explained  by the
close relationship  between inflation  and monetary  aggregates. This basic argument is
well-known  and has been explored from the seminal paper of Cagan 1958) to the
recent survey of Vegh (1992).
The puzzling question is why have rational governments adopted unstable
monetary policies given the long-term costs of  inflation on economic growth and
welfare.  These unstable policies should have been abandoned immediately if the
unsustainability  of these policies  was known  from the beginuing. A partial answer can
be found in the fact that governments  can benefit from money  creation to finance their
deficits for limited  periods of time.
Generally, the economic literature has explained the  (temporary) use of
inflationary  financing by the irrationality  of govemments  (e.g.  Sargent and Wallace
(1981))  faced with short-term  constraints,  or by political and institutional  shocks (see
Cukierman,  Edwards,  and Tabellini (1992)). These explanations,  as discussed  below,
are not entirely  convincing. On the contrary, this paper argues that the fluctuations  in
monetary  financing  are endogenous  and can be understood  in terms of rational  behavior
from governments.  A simple dynamic model is developed in which a government
maximizes  seignorage revenues by changing  monetary policy over time without any
time inconsistency. More specifically,  we wilU  show that the Government  may benefit
from unstable  monetary  policies  during limited  periods of time, but, in the end, the rate
of inflation should tend toward its steady-state  level as found by Friedman 20 years
ago.  This is consistent  with the Latin American  experience of the last two decades.
The paper proceeds  as follows. In Section  2, we expose  the simple  fact, shared
by  most Latin American countries, that inflation and  seignorage revenues were
extremely  volatile  over the last 20 years. Alternative  explanations  are explored  ranging- 2
TABLE 1:  Inflation Rate in 10 Latli  Amerian  Countries (1970-91)
(In Percentage)
Mean  Standard  Volatility
Country  Deviation
(1)  (2)  (2)/(1)
Argentina  594.9  1807.3  3.04
Bolivia  628.3  2577.8  4.10
Brazil  348.9  874.9  2.50
Chile  94.3  152.6  1.61
Columbia  22.2  6.8  0.31
Ecuador  25.6  19.8  0.78
Mexico  40.7  39.9  0.96
Peru  597.8  1656.1  2.77
Uruguay  62.8  26.5  0.42
Venezuela  17.0  18.9  1.12
Source: IFS, Consumer Price Index, quarterly  data.
TABLE 2: Contemporaneous CorTelation between Nominal













Note: Nominal  monetary  growth is defined
as the percentage  quarterly variations
in Ml,  and inflation  as the quarterly
change in CPI.-3  -
from the irrationality of the governments to changes in institutional and political factors.
In section 3, we develop a simple model in which a government maximizes monetary
revenues over time by adopting temporary unstable monetary policies.  Finally. Section
4 contains our concluding remarks.
2. Inflation Volatility and Seignorage Revenues: Some Latin American Evidence
Inflation has been extremely volatile in Latin America over the last twenty
years.  While the changes in inflation can be explained by a variety of factors ranging
from changes in international prices to labor market conditions,  we consider that this
instability  has  been  gene-rated principally  by  unstable  monetary  policies.  Simple
contemporaneous  correlations  support the evidence that nominal  quarterly monetary
growth has been a key factor in explaining inflation fluctuations in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil,  Chile  and  Peru  over  the  last  twenty  years  (Table  2).2  Tihese results  are
confirmed  by  the  recent  and  more  sophisticated statistical  analysis  carried  out  by
Phylaktis and Taylor (1993).
Frequently, unstable monetary policies have been associated with fiscal imbalances
and high and v  riable inflationary revenues in Latin American countries.  During the
period 1970-91, monetaLy  financing averaged  16 percent of total public financing in 10
Latin American countries; compared to only 2.0-2.5 percent in most OECD countries.3
Of particular  interest is that monetary revenues within countries  have also been very
volatile over time, the standard deviation of monetary financing being greater than its
average in 7 out of  10 countries (See Table 3).
2  The positive  but low  correlation  found  in Mexico  and Venezuela  reflects the importance  of external
factors  on domestic  prices due to the prominence  of the oil sector in these  economies. Hanson  (  1985'
also emphasized  the importance  of the costs of imported  inputs in explaining  inflation  in several Latin
American  countries.
3  Note that the extent to which Latin American  countries  used money  creation to finance their expendi-
tures varied  quite widely, with Argentina  relying on seignorage  to cover over 50 percent of its revenues
and Mexico  only 5 percent.-4-
TABLE 3:  Monetary Revenues in 10 Latin American Countries (1970-91)
(In Percentage)
Mean  Standard  VG tility
Country  Deviation
(1)  (2)  (2)/(1)
Argentina  52.9  76.5  1.44
Bolivia  22.2  43.8  1.97
Brazil  22.9  22.8  0.99
Chile  30.0  13.6  0.45
Columbia  12.9  37.7  2.91
Ecuador  12.9  15.6  1.20
Mexico  4.9  22.2  4.74
Peru  26.4  19.1  0.72
Uruguay  16.1  16.1  1.01
Venezuela  6.0  18.9  3.13
Source: IFS, quarterly  data.
Monetary  financing  is broadly  defined as the ratio of the increase
in base money  to total public revenues. This can overstate monetary
revenues  since variations  in monetary  base can also be the result of
changes  in international  reserves (in fixed -xchange  rate regimes)
and changes in interest paid on reserves.
Traditionally, the volatility of monetary financing has been explained by the myopia
of  governments,  which  faced to  short-term constraints,  are  unable or  unwilling  to
consider  the  long-term  costs  associated with  high  and  volatile  inflation.  Although
several attempts have been made to show that inflation is not necessarily  bad for a
country 4,  by  now,  there appears  to be  widespread agreement that  high and  volatile
inflation worsens  economic development and growth.  Howevei,  as pointed  out by
Alesina and  Drazen  (1992),  explanations based  on  irrationality,  such as  waiting to
stabilize until "things get really bad", are unconvincing: since the deterioration in the
fiscal  situation  can  be  foreseen,  the argument  depends  on  the  countries  that  use
inflationary financing being more irrational than others.
4  See , for example. the structuralist  view on inflation,  particularly  in the Latin American
context.5-
A recent trend in the econumic  literature  has foctised  on political  and institutional
shocks,  arguing  that for these reasons  Latin  Amerisan  countries  have to rely transitorily
on  inflation to  finance their  public expenditvufes. Along this  line  of  thought,
Cukierman,  Edwards and Tabellini (1992) have iecently suggested that unstable and
polarized political systems have constrained Latin American governments to  use
monetary  fLnancing  periodically  because  of the iiefficiency of their tax system. Alesina
and Drazen (1992) have also studied  a theoretical model with seignorage being the
consequence  of the inability to reach policy decisions.
This approach subscribes to the view that political stability and  institutional
reforms  more than reflecting  the willingness  of different groups to adhere to a social
contract  are key indicators  of economic  stability:  it is a noble model in which  political
and economic factors behave in a  systematic and purposeful way.  Accordingly,
Easterly  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991) have reviewed  that seignorage has been a large
source of temporary revenues during time of economic  and political crisis: surges in
seignorage  appear in Chile under Allende  in 1971, in Mexico  in 1982, and in Argentina
in  1975 and 1983.  Not surprisingly, however, the above approach fails to explain
several inflationary  episodes in Latin America  during the last twenty years.  Explana-
tions that give a key role to exogenous  shocks leave unexplained  both why variations
in inflationary  financing  do not necessarily  coincide  with significant  observable  changes
in external  circumstances  and why stable inonetary  financing  is not always observed in
politically  secure countries.  For example, as illustrated  below, inflationary  financing
has been extremely  volatile in Argentina  during 1987-89  in the absence of significant
observable  poLLical  and institutional  changes. Similarly, the relative political stability
in Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, and Chile since the early 1980s did not correspond  to
more stable monetary revenues over time compared  to politically-distressed  countries
such as Peru or Brazil (see Table 3).
This paper argues that the volatility  of monetary financing can be understood in
terms of a government's strategic  behavior. This idea was first discussed  by Sjaastad
(1976). Although  many would  object  that governments  are not motivated  by the desire
for seignorage,  at least not directly, we believe it has certainly been a conscious  part
of public policy in Latin America due to  its importance in public budgets.  This
approach has some major policy implications since, in  contrast to  the  approach
described in the preceding paragraph, it suggests  that a government's  capacity too  o  0  - - No  N'  US$  Million
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collect the inf,;-ai-)n  tax deterrnines  rather than is detenrined by other sources of
financing,  suggesting  that institutional  changes, required to raise alternative  sources of
public revenues (e.g.  privatization), follow rather than precede the elimination of
inflationary  revenues.  To make this more conLrete,  Argentina  provides an exc.llent
example of such a behavior.
Revenues  from monetary  financing  went through sharp cycles in Argentina during
most of the 1980s  (see Figure 1).s Traditionally,  the government  finances  went under
pressure at the end of the year because of seasonal factors such as payments (,f the
extra-month  salary and social security. To collect revenues  from monetary  financing,
the rate of inflation needed to increase  dramatically (see Figure lb).  After this first
phase of expansive  monetary  policy, the Government  started  a new adjustment  program
aimed at  rWducinr,  the  demonetization  process and  restoring the  private  sector's
confidence. This new program  was generally  accompanied  by a change in administra-
tion so that the public  was uncertain  about its true preferences;  that is, whether  this was
a  no-nonsense govermnent or  merely one pretending to  tackle the  serious fiscal
problems.  The governmezit  appeared successful  for some time in reducing inflation
which sustained public confidence, fueled money demand, and thus momentarily
postponed  the eventuality  of a tremendous  inflationary  surge.
This strategy was repeated  successfully  in 1988  and early 1989  as depicted  in Figure
la.  However, the reputation  of the Central Bank progressively  declined and, by end
of 1989, the reaction of private agents to  the  prospect of any inflation  tax became so
rapid and  sophisticated that  even small fiscal gaps--or other  shocks-- produced
precipitous  declines in money  demand. The demonetization  process was so intensive
during the course of  1989 that the authorities progressively realized that financing
deficits by printing money resulted in an increase rather than a decrease in the fiscal
5  In Figure  1, revenues from mooetory creation have  been adjusted for the variations in
intemational reserves (this was not done in Table 3).  La many instances the changes in the
monetary base were due to variations in money demand that are  provided by purchases of
international  reserves,  rather than by changes in fiscal policies.  Therefore, reserve purchases
or sales due to private sector operations have been subtracted from the series of revenue from
monetization.- 8 -
gap. 6 To halt this process, the Government  had no alternative  left than to adjust its
fiscal deficit, beginning  with the elimination  of the quasi-fiscal  deficit on January 1,
1990  and followed  by several structural  measures  such as privatizations  and administra-
tive and tax reforms in 1990 and 1991.
- . *  . 4  . . . e  . *  -
3.  A Small Model
The model developed hereafter can be viewed as an attempt to styLize  the facts
described in the preceding section.  We will show that the government maximizes
seignorage  revenues  over time by adopting  an unstable monetary  policy, but that in the
end the optimal inflation rate tends toward its steady-state-level. Unlike the majority
of studies on seignorage,  we chose not to limit the analysis  to the steady state for two
reasons: (1) we found it difficult  to think about policy commitment  in the steady  state,
and (2) we found it easy to lose sight of the fact that govermments  benefit from the
initial issue of money when the focus is on the steady-state.
The conventional  approach --and the simplest one-- of the inflation tax can be
summarized  as follows:
(1)  S, =  yt
(2)  m, =cee"'
(3)  t=  7rt
(4)  7r' =  7r,  +  (l-a)DT,
where .t is the growth rate of nominal  money, m the real money  stock, 'i,  the expected
rate of inflation, and 7r,  the observed rate of inflation.  '
6  Higher  inflation  resulted  in lower tax  revenues  due to the 'Olivera-Tanzi"  effect, and  in higher
interest  rates  charged  on the  indexed  domestic  debt.
7  D denotes d(.)/dt-9-
At this stage the model is standard and therefore briefly described.  Equation (1)
defines seignorage  as the monetary  growth times the real stock of money held at the
beginning  of period.  Equation (2) states that the real money  demand is a function of
the expected  rate of inflation. By convention,  we used the semi-log  forrn popularized
by Cagan.  In equation (3), the observed inflation rate is equal to monetary growth.
Final4y;.the  expc.ocd inflation is .defned in.  equation (4) as the average between the
existing  rate of inflation  adjusted for the change  in inflation  observed during t and t- 1.
Thus, the inflation  rate maximizing  seignorage  can be written as:
(5)  7r*, +  (I-or)Dw*t/dt  - (1/b)ln(7r*) =  k
where k is a constant
In accordance  with the assumptions  of the standard model, the optimum inflation
rate converges (or explodes)  toward its steady-state  value without fluctuations  (for a
numerical  illustration,  see Figure 2).  The steady-state  value equals the inverse of the
semi-elasticity  of money demand (7r*=1/b) 9 with the convergence  speed positively
correlated  to the degree of expectation  adjustment  (a) and to the semi-elasticity  of the
money  demand with respect to expected inflation  (b).  These results are conventional
and correspond  to those found by Bailey (1956)  and Friedman  30 years ago.
The standard model presents, at  least, one important caveat.  The absence of
fluctuations  in the inflation  path over time contradicts  the empirical  evidence  reviewed
in the preceding section.  The next step is therefore to change the model in that
direction;  this can be done by simply  modifying  the expectation  mechanism  chosen in
equation  (4).
This expe.ctation  mecharnism  corresponds to the adaptive one only when the first two lagged
terms of inflation are taken into account.
The steady state value of the optimal inflation rate is determined as  follows:  7r  - (1/b)ln(7r')
=  k.  Then, taking the first-derivative of each side of the above equation, we can rewrite the
optimal inflation rate as:  7r* =  I/b; i.e.  the inverse of the semi-elasticity of the money
demand.- 10 -
In his pioneering work, Cagan was careful  in pointing out  the limitations of  an
expectations mechanism exclusively  based  on the  gap  between the actual  and  past
inflation rates because people systematically underestimate the future inflation rate in
periods  of accelerating  inflation, but  they overestimate  it in periods  of decelerating
inflation.  This systematic behavior is inconsistent with risk-averse  agents.  Rather, we
should expect that private agents  will attempt to collect more information in countries
with high and  volatile inflation.  The  recent theoretical literature  has  described the
central role of information costs in the formation process of inflation expectations (see
Benabou (1992) for a summary).  In times of accelerating inflation, buyers  react by
comparing more prices and collecting more information on the inflationary process; the
main reason being that the information costs relative to other welfare losses are reduced
in periods of accelerating inflation.  Private agents become more experienced and make
revisions faster when prices rise at a faster rate.  To capture this idea, the expectations
mechanism depends not only on the variation in inflation (Dxr,), but also the rate of
change in inflation (DVr,).  Thus,
(4b)  7r', =  ir, +  (l-a)D7r,  +  D2ir,  with n >  0
We should point out that this is only one approach that can be taken in attempting
to model the behavior of the coefficient of expectations (see Khan (1977)).  Equation
(4b), however,  seems to be the simplest form.
The influence of the rate of change in inflation on expectations can be illustrated by
the money demand behavior during periods of volatile inflation.  One extreme case can
be found during hyperinflationary episodes --uncontrolled acceleration of the inflation
rate--  when unexpected large  portfolio  shifts occur  from domestic  currency  toward
indexed assets or foreign assets.
The relationship between the rate of change in inflation and money demand can be
traced out for the case of Argentina.  An equation which explains well the evolution of
real money demand over the last 20 years is the following' °:
I.0  We proceed by substituting equation (4b) into equation (2).  The  resulting  equation  was
estimated with the ordinary least square method (OLS), but adjusted for autocorrelation  (AR 1),
(continued...(2')  In(Ml),  ln(a) - b7rr +  (l-u)D)r, +  lD 27r)
b  =  0.593;  a  =  0.154;  B =  0.542;
(7.33)  (5.01)  (3.58)
with AdjR&  =  0.962;  DW =  2.11
The econometric  evidence suggests  that fluctuations  in real money demand can be
partially explained by variations in the acceleration of inflation.  This result seems
robust  to changes in the number  of lags and/or in the omission  of different  explanatory
variables.  For example, we tested the equation with dummy variables to capture
eventual structural changes  due to different exchange rate regimes, and the estimated
coefficients  did not appear  qualitatively  different. The semi-elasticity  of money  demand
(b) is low  as generally  found in highly  inflationary  countries  (see  Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1991))."  The low value of the coefficient a reflects the fact that private
agents were extremely  fast in revising  their expectations  in Argentina.
We now turn to the question  to how the new expectation  mechanism  modifies  the
optimal inflation behavior in comparison  to the one obtained by using the standard
model. Substituting  (4b, into the small system (1)-(3),  the rate of inflation  maximizing
seignorage  revenues is defined by:
(5b)  BD%r*,  +  (l-a)D7r*, +  r* - (1/b)ln(ir*,) =  k
10(.  ..continued)
over the 1972(1)-1992(12)  period. The dependent  variable was defined  as the natural loga-
rithm of real Ml,  and inflation  as the monthly  variation  of the CPI.  We used monthly  daid.
121  The relatively  low elasticity  of money  demsand  to inflation  suggests  that the seignorage
maximizing  inflation  rate is high, about 166  percent.  According  to Easterly  and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991), such a result is a regularity  of high inflationary  countries.  However, it is
worth underscoring  that our result is substantially  lower than the one obtained  with a Cagan
function  money  demand,  equivalent  to 670 percent (available  upon request  from the author).
This difference  may be explained  by tbe inclusion  of the rate of change  in inflation as an
explanatory  variable rather than a Cagan-function  money  dernand. The introduction  of the rate
of change is similar  to the idea developed  by Easterly,  Mauro, Schmidt-Hebbel  (1992) who
argue that  the semi-elasticity  of money  demand  is falling  with respect  to inflation.  Both
developments  lead to the conclusion  that the maximizing  inflation  rate is overestimated  by
using the Cagan-function  money  demand.- 12 -
At first sight, the non-Linearity  properties  of equation  (5b)  seem to prevent  the (easy)
determination of  the  optimal path  followed by  inflation.  However, numerical
simulations  can be used to identify  such a behavior.  Thus, modifying  equation (5b)
from continuous to discrete time and approximating Dl?r*, by 7r*, 1 - 2.r*,  +  7r*t-.,  we
can rewrite (5b) as:
(6b)  7r  *,.  =  [lI(B-(1-ar)][  -r*  -(l-a)7r*,  +  k  +  (1/b)ln(7r*t)  - B(7r*t+l -27r"t)]
The lagged  rate of inflation  is a nonlinear  function of the current inflation  rate (7r)
and the future inflation rate (7r,+ 1).  The optimal inflation behavior  can be determined
backwards  assuming  that the steady-state  value of inflation  equals I/b; i.e. the inflation
rate at time t determined  the inflation  rate at time t-l  and so on.  Note the magnitude
and the frequency  of the fluctuations  in the optimal  inflation rate depend  on the extent
to which  peop'e take into account  the rate of change  in inflation  into their expectations  -
-the value of the parameter B.  At the limit, with simple  adaptive expectations  (B =0),
the optimal inflation rate tends to its steady-state  value without fluctuations  as shown
in Figure 2.
The optimal  inflation  path derived from this exercise is illustrated  in Figure 2 for the
case of Argentina. The coefficients  are those estimated  earlier.  One of the striking
characteristics is that the optimal inflation rate closely followed the path observed
during the second half of the 1980s,  though the steady-state  value appears to be higher
than in reality (see Figure lb).  At the beginning  the fluctuations  are very large, then
they progressively  decline, and finally the inflation rate converges  toward its steady-
state value.
The model suggests that an expansive  monetary policy is optimal when the rate of
inflation  is relatively  low in order to confiscate  the existing real balances. Alternative-
ly, when the inflation rate is high, the authorities should adopt a restrictive monetary
policy. Such a behavior  does not suffer from a time inconsistency  problem since  when
the policy is evaluated  in each period; it is not systematically  decided  to confiscate  the
existing real balances (by running high inflation)  and promise lower inflation in the
future.  Over time, however, the fluctuations  in the rate of monetary growth shouldFigure 2:
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decrease to allow people to  reconstitute  their real monetary balances.  Expansive
monetary  policy would  only lead  to the acceleration  of demonetization,  reducing  rather
than increasing  seignorage revenues.  As described earlier, such a behavior closely
corresponds  to the Argentine  experience  during the second  hialf  of the 1980s.
4. Concludine Remarks
During the last twenty years,  inflation rates have been high and extremely volatile
in Latin America.  At the same time, monetary revenues (seignorage) accounted for a
substantial share of public financing but with  relatively large fluctuations over time.
If the  association between high  inflation and  seignorage has been fertile ground for
researchers,  it remains unclear why governments choose to adopt unstable monetary
policies,  specifically when it is known that they are unsustainable in the long run.
In this pape_r,  we have argued that governments follow unstable monetary policies
principally  in order  to maximize seignorage revenues.  We also consider that the use
of  inflationary  finance can  also  be partially  explained by institutional  and  political
factors as suggested by a  recent trend of the literature and partially by the irrational
behavior of the authorities.  Temporary unstable monetary policies are optimal if people
tend to revise their expectations (slower)faster in periods of (des)accelerating inflation.
When the rate of inflation is relatively high, a restrictive policy should be implemented
so that people can reconstitute monetary balances, and when the rate of inflation is low,
an expansive monetary policy should be developed to confiscate existing real balances.
However,  this  mechanism can  not  be repeated  indefinitely because people  learn to
anticipate unstable inflation, and they progressively reduce their real monetary balances.
In  the  end,  the  optimal  inflation  rate  tends  toward  its  steady-state  level  to  stop
demonetization.  Such a maximizing behavior has been tested numerically in the case
of Argentina,  and the results correspond to those predicted by the model.
To the extent that changes in monetary policies depend on the govemment's  ability
to manage the cost-benefit of inflation over time, one can wonder whether inflation will
reappear in currently  successful countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, or Peru?
The authorities may actually be tempted to develop unstable monetary policies oil the
belief  that  people  gradually  loses  their  capacity  to  anticipate the  linkage  between- 15 -
monetary policy and inflation.  Similarly, how long will the Brazilian Government be
able to follow unstable monetary policies without generating hyperinflation?  Over the
last few years,  several adjustment plans have successively failed, but the public seems
to remain uncertain whether the next program will be successful in reducing inflation,
sustaining public confidence, fueled money demand (as well as public bonds demand),
and thus momentarily postponing the eventuality of a tremendous inflationary surge.
The  argument  developed  in  this  paper  relies  on  the  assumption  that  inflation
volatility is the result of a govemment's  strategic behavior in managing the cost and
benefits of monetary financing.  This view is obviously extreme since, in reality, other
factors such as adverse economic shocks or unstable political conditions also explain
variations in the rate of inflation.  Nonetheless, the close relationship between inflation
and  monetary  growth  as  weli as  the  weight  of  monetary  financing  in  total  public
revenues give support to this explanation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.
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